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Abstract
There  is currently  a large  interest in understanding  firms'  percentage  of total employment)  in  Eastern European
access to finance,  particularly  in the financing  of small-  countries is smaller  than in most developed economies.
and medium-size  enterprises  (SMEs).  But the financing  Although  the authors  find in almost every country  in the
patterns of SMEs across countries  is not well  understood.  sample a large  number of SMEs as a percentage  of total
For example, little is known about the relative  firms, the SMEs in  Eastern Europe  are generally small
importance  of equity,  debt, and inter-firm  financing for  and hire  few employees.  However, SMEs seem to
SMEs across countries.  constitute  the most dynamic sector of the Eastern
The authors  use the Amadeus  database,  which  includes  European  economies, relative to large firms. In general,
financial information on over 97,000 private and  the SME sector comprises relatively  younger,  more
publicly traded  firms in 15  Eastern  and Central  European  highly  leveraged,  and more profitable and faster growing
countries. The Amadeus database  allows the authors the  firms. This suggests that a new type of firm is emerging
opportunity  to provide  a new analysis of the general  in transition  economies that is more market- and profit-
financing patterns  of private  firms across a large sample  oriented.  But at the  same time,  these firms appear to
of Eastern European  countries.  The summary statistics  have financial constraints  that impede their access to
show that the size of the SME sector  (as measured  by the  long-term financing  and ability to grow.
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NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Agnes Yaptenco, room MC3-446, telephone  202-473-1823, fax 202-522-
1155,  email  address ayaptenco@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research Working  Papers are  also posted on the Web  at http:/H
econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  Iklapper@worldbank.org,  vsl89@columbia.edu,  or
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For most of the  19th  and  20th  centuries,  large  corporations  were  considered the primary  and
driving  force  of economic  and technological  progress.  Very large corporations  dominated  research
and development  (R&D)  and the introduction  of innovations,  and experienced  major  improvements
in production efficiency.  The exploitation of economies of scale and scope were considered to be the
driving  force of economic  development.  As Schumpeter  (1942)  proclaimed,  "What we have  got to
accept is that the large-scale  enterprise has come to be the most powerful engine of progress".  Since
the contribution  of small and medium size enterprises  (SMEs) was small, economists  considered this
sector less important.
Beginning in the  1970s, however,  large manufacturing  firms in key industries  began to loose
competitiveness  and a number of important empirical  studies  began to document the critical  role of
SMEs.  For example,  Acs (1984)  argued that newer and smaller  firms entered  sectors as  "agents of
change".  Studies  using direct measures  of innovative  activity - such  as  measures of new products
and processes  - replaced  older measures  (such  as  R&D)  and  showed that  innovative  activity  was
introduced  by small  firms and not the  larger incumbents  (see Acs and Audrestsch,  1988  and  1990).
SMEs also began to play an important role as efficient providers  of intermediate  goods and  services
to large  firms.  Many papers  showed that developed  countries that encouraged  entrepreneurship  and
SMEs had higher economic growth.'
Previous studies also showed the shift in the industrial structure away  from large corporations
and towards SMEs during the  1980s and  1990,s.2 Several explanations  have been offered to account
for this structural  change.  For example,  Audretsch  and Thurik (2000)  suggested that the increase  in
l For example,  see Schimitz (1989), Acs (1992), Calderon and Nickel (1998) and Audretsch and
Thurik (2000).
2 For example, see Acs and Audretsch (1993), Loveman and Senegenberger (1991) and Thurik
(1996).
2the  level  of education  and  business  skills  in the United  States  increased  entrepreneurship  and  new
firms.  Others have  focused on the inflexibility  of large  conglomerates  to react to globalization  and
new technology  and  innovations,  which  encouraged  managers  and  other insiders  at  large  firms to
leave and compete in a more efficient environment.
However,  the  underlying  story  of the  introduction  of SMEs  in Eastern  European  countries
seems to be quite different.  Unlike the United States, which experienced a natural  birth of new, small
firms, the  SME  sector  in  Eastern  European  countries  emerged  as a result of the privatization  and
breakup of large  state-owned  enterprises,  as well  as through a large number of new,  generally very
small  firms  that  came  as  a  consequence  of the  market  liberalization  process.3 We  see  in Eastern
Europe  a  unique  role  for  SMEs  during  "transitional"  periods  of change.  The  restructuring  and
downsizing  of  large  firms,  the  privatization  of  public  utilities  and  other  large  companies,  the
outsourcing of many support services,  and the vertical fragmentation  of production are all forces that
promoted the creation and expansion of SMEs.
A number of recent papers have discussed  the characteristics  and role of SMEs  in developed
countries,  but  little  has been  said  about SMEs in Eastern  Europe.4 Given  the unique  nature  of the
financial  development  and market  structure  in Eastern European  countries,  we  would expect  to see
some  distinctions  in  the  firm  characteristics  and  financing  choices  of  SMEs  in  these  countries,
relative  to previous  studies.  The AMADEUS  database  - which  includes  financial  information  on
over 5 million registered  firms in  Eastern  and  Western Europe  - offers  an excellent opportunity  to
study the firm  characteristics of the SME sector in a wide  range of countries.  In this first  summary
paper  we  focus  our  analysis  on the  characteristics  of over  97,000  firms  in  a  sample  of Eastern
3 See Svejnar (2002).
4There have been a number of country-specific  World Bank surveys of SMEs in Eastern Europe.
For example, we discuss in Section 3 a survey of SMEs in Romania by Chaves, Sanchez, Schor and
Tesliuc (2001) and a survey of Russian firms by Broadman and Recanatini, 2001.
3European countries, with special focus on SMEs (that represent  about 82% of the total  sample).5 We
provide  some evidence  on the main differences  between  SMEs and  large corporations  in  15 Eastern
European countries.
We  also  include  a  discussion  of  our  cross-country  findings  on  the  firm  and  country
characteristics  that affect firms'  access to finance and the  financing of SMEs in particular.  There is
an extensive  literature examining the capital  structure  choices of firms in developed  and developing
countries,  although most studies exclude  small firms.6 In this paper we provide a new analysis of the
general  financing patterns  of private  firms across  countries.  With the  caveat,  however,  that we  are
providing neither an exhaustive nor rigorous analysis of capital structure, but only showing some key
preliminary results that should only be seen as a starting point for future research.
The paper proceeds  as follows.  Section 2 describes the Amadeus database,  the financial and
descriptive  variables  available  for  each  firm,  and  limitations  of the  data.  Section  3 reviews  the
previous  literature relating to the SME sectors in particular and the development of financial  markets
in Eastern Europe in general.  Section 4 provides summary statistics and a discussion of the Amadeus
data, by age, size, and leverage.  Section 6 discusses future avenues for research and concludes.
5 Throughout this paper we use the European convention of defining the SME sector as firms with
less than 250 employees.
6 For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995)  and Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt,  and Maksimovic
(2001) study the capital structure of developed  and developing countries, respectively,  although these
papers use only a sample of publicly-traded firms.
42. Description of the Amadeus Data
The  data  used  in  this  paper  come  from  the  Amadeus-Bureau  Van  Dijk  database,  which
includes  firm-level  data  on  over  5 million private  and publicly  owned  non-financial  firms  in  34
European  countries, including 15 Eastern European countries.  Our analysis in this paper focuses only
on the  15 Eastern  European  and Central Asian "transition"  economies:  five  countries of the former
Soviet  Union  - Russia,  Ukraine,  Estonia,  Lithuania  and  Latvia  - and  ten  other  former  socialist
countries - Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Bulgaria, Croatia,  the Czech Republic,  Hungary, Poland,  Romania,
Slovakia,  Slovenia  and  Yugoslavia.  The  total  sample  of Eastern  European  firms  includes  over
500,000 enterprises.7
The Amadeus  database  is created  by collecting  standardized  data received  from 50 vendors
across Europe.  The local source for this data is generally company registrar offices, which require all
incorporated  firms  to  submit  annual  filings.  The  database  includes  firm-level  accounting  data  in
standardized  financial format comprising 22 balance sheet items, 22 profit and loss income statement
items, and 21  financial ratios.  A list of all available  financial information is provided in Appendix 2.
These  financial  profiles  are  augmented  with  descriptive  information  including:  official  national
identification  number,  address,  telephone,  fax,  website,  legal  form,  year of incorporation,  senior
managers,  auditors,  number of employees,  quoted/unquoted  indicator,  industry  and  activity  codes
and, when available,  a trade description  in the  local  language and English.  Furthermore,  Amadeus
includes detailed ownership  information,  including the names and country(s)  of origins of all  block
shareholders  (with  greater than  5%  shareholding).  Supplemental  information  is  also  available  on
subsidiaries.
7 This includes about 300,000 very small Romanian firms.
5From  1990  to  1996,  Amadeus collected  data on only large and listed companies  (similar to
WorldScope  and  GlobalVantage  coverage).  Since  then  the  coverage  has  continued  to  gradually
increase  and since  1998 has  included  extended coverage  for small  and medium-size  enterprises  in
Eastern  European  countries.  However,  we  include  in this  analysis  only  firms  with  10  or  more
employees,  since  Amadeus  coverage  of  very  small  firms  varies  with  country-level  filing
requirements.  For example,  some  countries (such as the Ukraine  and Russia)  do not require  sole-
proprietors to report financial information.  We believe that this cutoff- consistent with the inclusion
criteria  used  by Amadeus  for  their main  database  sold to  commercial  customers  - corrects for the
sample-biases  in the number of smallest firms.  After excluding firms with missing employment data
and firms with employment less than 10, our final  sample includes about 97,000 firms.8
Some additional caveats are necessary.  Although  all firms in our sample have basic  financial
data (i.e.  total assets  and  total liabilities),  nevertheless,  detailed  coverage  of capital  structure  and
performance  varies across  countries.9 For example,  firms in Latvia and Russia are missing turnover
variables  and  firms  in  Slovenia  and  Croatia  only  report  total  liabilities  and  do  not  include  a
breakdown of their debt structures  (such as maturity).  In addition, determining  the legal  "type" of
firms (publicly traded,  private or state owned, etc.) is a serious challenge  of  the data.  Firms include
country-specific  descriptions  and more than 150 legal type categories exist across countries.  To date,
we have  only investigated  these  legal  definitions  in  order to identify  less  than  1,000  state-owned
enterprises  and  non-profit  organizations  that  we  have  exclude  from our  sample.'0 The  number  of
state-owned  firms  in  our  sample  is  small  because  the  Amadeus  data  is  intended  to  cover  only
8 Appendix  1 shows, for comparison, summary statistics of firms with less than 10 employees.
9 We exclude from our sample firms missing basic financial information such as total assets and total
liabilities.
10 We also excluded a small number of financial  intermediaries,  since their balance  sheets and income
statements are not comparable to non-financial firms.
6privately  owned  firms.  Our  final  sample  includes  all  non-financial  privately  owned  and publicly
traded firms.
We use  1999  data for our analysis, which  is the year with the maximum  data coverage.  Our
final  sample  size is 97,107  enterprises.  Table  1 shows the  cross-country  coverage of the Amadeus
database  in  1999 by country,  size,  and sector.  We  see that some countries like Romania,  Bulgaria,
and  the Ukraine  include  a large  number  of firms,  while  other  countries  like  Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Lithuania,  and  Slovenia  include a relatively  small number of firms.  There are a number of possible
explanations  for the variation  in the number  of firms across countries.  First,  the actual  number of
active enterprises  may be a result of differences  in the population and size and level of development
of the private  sector  across  countries.  A  second  reason  is that  our data includes  only  firms  in the
"formal sector" that are incorporated  and pay company registration fees and taxes, and the size of the
informal SME sector may be larger in some countries.
Table  1 also shows  the  size of the  SME  sector  across countries  - which  we  define  as firms
with less  than 250  employees  - and  as  a percentage  of total firms  and population.  We  find that  a
large percentage of firms are categorized  as SMEs:  On average,  82% of firms in Eastern Europe are
SMEs,  ranging  from  very  low  percentages  in  Russia  and  the  Ukraine,  48.98%  and  54.33%,
respectively,  to 97.8% in Estonia."  In Section 4 we  explore possible country-level  explanations  for
these differences.
3. Literature Review
3.1. Access to Financing  by the SME Sector
1 We also see a very close correlation between the SME percentages  and rankings (1-15) of the SME
sector as a percentage of firms and as a percentage of the total population (64% and 95%,
respectively).
7Previous  literature  has studied  SME access to financing  and shown that SMEs have different
capital  structures  than large  firms.  For  example,  Cressy  and  Olofsson  (1997)  found  that  smaller
businesses have lower fixed-to-total assets ratios, higher ratios of current liabilities to total assets and
are financially more risky.  Scherr,  et al.  (1990) and Hamilton  and Fox (1998) suggested that smaller
companies  limit their issuance of outside equity in order not to reduce control of their firms.
The literature  has also discussed  reasons why it is harder for SMEs to access debt financing.
For example,  Berger and  Udell  (1995)  found that  small  and young  firms - with generally  shorter
banking  relationships  - pay  higher  interest  rates  and  are  more  likely  to  be  required  to  pledge
collateral.  Satio  and Villanueva  (1981)  and Peel  and Wilson  (1996)  showed  that in general  SMEs
have higher costs and reduced access to financing because of the information asymmetries  associated
with newer,  smaller  firms.  Furthermore,  Levy  (1993)  concluded  that restricted  access  to financial
services  slows the growth of SMEs.  In comparison to these previous  studies, the summary  statistics
for our sample of Eastern European countries show that finrs in transition countries often behave in a
different way.
Previous  studies also show the unique  challenges to  SMEs to access outside  borrowing  and
suggest  country-specific  environmental  factors - such  as creditor  rights and  legal  efficiency  - that
affect  SME  access to  financing.  This  literature  suggests that banks  should  be  able  to  make  more
loans to smaller, riskier firms  in countries that offer stronger  creditor rights - such as the priority of
secured  creditors  in  the  case  of default.  For  example,  Brush  and  Chaganti  (1998)  found  that
ownership  structure and creditors  rights protection have significant positive influence on the size and
performance  of SMEs.  Furthermore,  Beck Demirguc-Kunt,  and Maksivmovic  (2002)  showed  that
small firms are most credit constrained as a result of underdeveloped  financial and legal systems and
8higher corruption.  We expect legal development  to affect SME access to financing  in our sample of
Eastern European countries.
3.2. Financial  Development in Eastern Europe
There  is a small, but growing,  body of literature that studies various financial characteristics
of Eastern  European countries.  One of the few cross-country  studies  is Gros  and  Suhrchke  (2000),
who  did a comprehensive  analysis of the similarities  and difference between  transition  countries  in
Eastern Europe and other comparable  developing economies.  They highlighted some characteristics
common to all transition economies  at the initial  stage of reform such us a concentration of firms in
the  industrial/ manufacturing  sector, the  underdevelopment of financial  systems,  and  low legal  and
governance standards.  Throughout our analysis we find patterns that are substantially consistent with
this initial description.
A  recent  World  Bank  report  also  performed  a  broad  analysis  of the  development  of the
corporate  sector  of most Eastern  European  and  former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  countries  during  the
transition from communist to market economies.12 This report described the  size and characteristics
of the SME sector across countries and showed the gain to GDP that could be reached by reallocating
resources  from the old state enterprises  to  the dynamic new SME  sector.  This paper measured  the
size of the SME sector as the percentage  of total employment attributable to the SME sector in 1995,
and found results that are generally consistent  with ours, although they report higher percentages  of
SMEs across all  countries.  However,  we  would expect our findings to be somewhat  different  since
we use  a base year of 1999 and because  we only include the  sample of firms included  in Amadeus,
which  may  not  include  very  small  firms.  However,  our  data confirms  their  general  results;  for
12 "Transition,  The First Ten Years, Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet
Union", 2002.
9example, the paper mentioned  the particular dynamism of SMEs in the case of Poland and Hungary,
where structural reforms generated a favorable climate  for the entry of new enterprises.  Accordingly,
we find in these countries relatively high levels of firm  performance  and the lowest percentages  of
distressed firms.
However,  most studies  have  sampled just one or a few transition economies and  focused  on
specific  aspects  of their  financial  development.  For  example,  a  recent  paper  by Broadman  and
Recanatini  (2002)  analyzed  the privatization  process  in Russia and its impact  on the labor  market.
Their  evidence  suggests  that  the  downsizing  of Russian  firms  was  only partially  completed  and,
consequently, the overstaffing  typical of the socialist regime has not been adequately resolved.  Our
data  support  this  result  - we  find  that  Russian  firms  have  comparatively  high  levels  of median
employment  and that the  SME  sector  shows  relatively  scarce  participation  as  a percentage  of total
employment.  Our  evidence  also  confirms  their  result  that  Russian  firms  showed  a  positive
correlation between firm size and profitability.
Other  studies  have  highlighted  the  success  stories  of  country-specific  initiatives.  For
example,  a report "Labor Market  Adjustment in Estonia" (1998) discussed the "massive  increase  in
worker flows"  seen during the Estonian reform.  This report argued that SMEs had been the driving
force behind the job creation process, specifically those concentrated in the service and trade-oriented
sectors.  In agreement with this claim, we find that the Estonian SME sector contributed  71% of the
total  employment  and  is typified  by very  small  (and  profitable)  firms  with a median  of only  21
employees (after excluding all firms with less than  10 employees).
Other  studies  have discussed  the  effect of the development  of the lending  environment  on
access to  financing.  For example,  Egerer  (1995)  studied bank lending  in the Czech Republic.  He
found that firms had difficulty borrowing,  since corporate  performance  is not transparent  and weak
10creditor rights and  collateral  laws discourage  collateral-based  lending.  He suggested that ownership
connections between  banks and firms could be beneficial  in transition economies to overcome  these
information  asymmetries  and  weak  laws.  Although  we  cannot  identify  bank  ownership,  we
document  in  the  next  section  that  Eastern  European  firms  in  our  sample  rarely  use  long-term
financing.
Finally,  given the large  share of Romanian firms  in our sample (about 28%),  it is especially
relevant to  comment on a recent  paper that studied Romanian  financial  markets  (Chaves,  Sanchez,
Schor and Tesliuc,  2001).  Although this  paper specifically  focused on the financial  accessibility  of
rural  economic  agents  (enterprises  and households),  we think that many of the paper's result apply
more universally  to the corporate  sector (although the agriculture  sector represents  only  12%  of our
sample).  For example,  the paper describes the  impediments that all sectors  face in getting efficient
financial  services  and, once again, how real access to investment opportunities are closely related to
the degree of ownership and other associations with financial intermediaries.  The paper suggests that
part  of the  reason  for the  low  level  of financing  in Romania  is the  inability  to  borrow long-term,
which  is caused  by inflation  and  weak  legal protection.  The report  also  discusses the overall  low
profitability  levels that characterize  Romanian firms  (when measured  as  ROA),  which  is consistent
with our results. 13
Lastly, it is worth commenting on some related research that has used the Amadeus  database.
There have  been some studies using the Amadeus data but, to our knowledge,  none of them  has had
the more  comprehensive  approach that  is pursued  in  this report.  Koke and  Salem  (2000)  study a
cross section of ten CEE countries to test whether corporate  capital  structure works as  a disciplining
device.  Their intuition is that firms more in need to downsize, due to lower levels of productivity and
13 Additional  country-specific  studies include  S. Kukar (1996) for Slovenia, V. Cieslar (1996) for the
Czech Republic, and G. Minassian G. and S. Totev (1996) for Bulgaria.
11profitability,  would  be  more  likely to  do so if the external  pressure  is large,  i.e.  if there  is a high
dependence  on outside borrowing.  Budina et al.  (undated) used the Amadeus data to study access to
financing in Bulgarian  firms.  They found low levels of liquidity constraints,  which they interpreted
as not necessarily  associated with low equity premiums  (as would  be the  explanation  in developed
countries)  but rather as a result of the presence of soft-budget constraints  and an inefficient financial
sector.
4. Summary Statistics of Firms in Eastern Europe
We  begin  with  an  overview  of the  total  sample  of firms  in  order  to  capture  the  general
characteristics  of the region and specificities  of each individual  country.  As described in Section 3,
our study focuses on a sample of 15 Eastern European countries for the year  1999.  Since our analysis
includes  five  countries of the former  Soviet  Union,  we also  compare  the  characteristics of firms  in
these  countries  with those  in the  remaining  countries.  Median  summary  statistics,  by country,  are
presented  in Table  2.  We  discuss  median summary statistics,  since  although we have attempted to
identify and delete incorrect data observations,  there are still a number of large outliers in our sample.
We show mean summary statistics for all tables in the Annex, which are consistent with the mendian
values.  Table 3 shows summary statistics  for all firms for all countries and disaggregated by size and
age.
The  median -firm  size  has  great  variation  across  countries,  as  measured  by  number  of
employees,  total  assets.  and  total  sales.o  However,  the -median  age  is  less  than  10  years  for  all
countries  (except  for  Bosmnia-Her2egovina),-  suggesting  that  most  firms  were  created  during  the
transition period.  Although ma-ny of the,firms -. particularly-in the FSU countries - may be spin-offs
12of former state-owned  companies,  this still  implies that the majority of firms  are operating  under a
relatively new corporate  structure.
Table 2 (and the first column of Table 3)  also demonstrate  that most countries in our sample
exhibit relatively  low use of outside  financing,  as shown by leverage ratios (measured  as the ratio of
liabilities-to-equity  and debt-to-equity)  with medians  about equal to 0.92 and 0.84, respectively.  In
the  Ukraine  - at  the lowest  extreme of the  distribution  - total  liabilities-to-equity  and total  debt-to
equity equal 0.29 and 0.27, respectively.  Firms in 6 out of 15 countries have total liabilitiy ratios less
than one, which suggests that the firm borrows less than $1  for every $2 invested in equity.  This is in
comparison  to a median leverage  ratio of 1.73 for the Amadeus  sample of Western  European firms.
We  also  find  almost  no use of long-term  debt  (median  short-term-to-total  debt ratios  equal  one  in
almost all  countries), which  may be the result of the underdevelopment  of the banking  sector, poor
collateral law, and weak collateral registries.
Median profitability  ratios (measured  by return on assets,  ROA,  and return on equity,  ROE)
are 0.05 and 0.06, respectively,  which is about equal to the median ratios across developed  Western
European  countries.  However,  median  1-year  sales  growth  is  negative  in all but  one  country  for
which  1998  data  is  available;  in comparison,  median  1-year  sales  growth  rates  are  positive  in  all
Western  European countries.  This combination  of weak  performance  plus low access to  financing
suggests a risk of prolonged corporate contraction.
We also find that firms across many countries have low levels of inter-firm trade financing  -
as shown by account payable-to-equity ratios close to zero - with the exception of Hungary (and, to a
lesser degree,  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland  and Romania.)  This may  be explained  by a number of
interesting reasons - first, the overall  low levels of growth and leverage  suggest that firms may not
have  sufficient internal  funds or access to external borrowing to finance the extension of trade credit.
13Second,  in many developing  countries  trade  credit is predominately  offered by  large domestic  and
multinational  firms  that can  finance  their  extension  of trade  credit  in  foreign  markets.  With  the
exception of the Central European  countries such as Hungary  and Poland - where we  see the use of
trade credit - there is not yet a large foreign presence in the region.
Finally,  low-levels  of trade  credit  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of Demirguc-Kunt  and
Maksimovic  (2001)  that  the  development  of the  banking  system  and  the  efficiency  of the  legal
environment predict  the use of trade credit.  Indeed,  we find that those countries  with higher  use of
trade credit (Hungary,  Romania,  and  Poland) also have relatively  more developed financial  markets
and legal efficiency (see Table 6).  Furthermore,  Table  7 shows negative correlations  in all countries
with available  data between trade credit (as  a percentage of total  liabilities)  and total  debt-to-equity
ratios.  This implies that with  the caveat  that the  overall  level  of trade credit use if small,  we find
evidence  consistent with the finding in previous  literature that trade  credit is used as a substitute  for
bank  financing  in countries with weak financial  institutions  (Petersen and Rajan,  1997, and Fisman
and Love, 2002).
4.1 Summary Statistics by Age
Table 4 shows summary statistics by three firm age categories:  0-3, 4-10, and greater than  10.
Overall,  the  firms in our  sample  could be considered  as relatively  young - about  15%  of the firms
have been created during the  last three  years and, as expected in transition countries,  almost 65%  of
all firms have only existed as such for less than  10 years.  Even though there is broad cross-country
variation, FSU countries  appear to exhibit the highest participation  of young firms (for example, over
20% of total firms in Estonia, Lithuania,  Russia, and Slovakia were  incorporated in the last 3 years).
14Median age in the total  sample ranges  from 5 to 17,  (or 5 to 9 if we  exclude Bosnia-Herzegovina),
whereas FSU firms tend to be even younger, and the median range goes from only 5 to 6 years.
We  find that new  firms are  in general  relatively  smaller  firms  across the  total sample.  For
example, we  show that 85% of firms age  0-3  are SMEs  (compared to 59% of firms over  10 years).
Median  size,  measured  by total  assets,  varies  across  the sample  from  tiny firms  in Romania  with
assets  valued  at about  $US  200,000,  to a median  firm size of almost  US$  5 million  in the case of
Poland.1 4 If we define size as the number of employees  (as we do for most of our analysis),  we also
find  a  strong  relationship  between  firm  size  and  age,  where  all  but  two  countries  have  median
employment in new firms of less than 125  employees  (only Ukraine  and Russia, two countries  of the
former  Soviet  Union,  show  much  higher  employment  with  median  employment  of  186  and  285,
respectively).
The contribution  to  total  employment  generated  by  young firms  also  presents  wide  cross-
country variation.  However,  looking  across the total sample, the subset of youngest firms (0-3 years)
contributes only about  15% of total employment  (the largest contribution is seen in Romania and the
Ukraine,  where  this  group  generates  19%  of total  employment).' 5 Nevertheless,  in  11  out of  15
countries included in the sample, firms in their first  10 years generate over 50% of total employment.
In addition, we find that new firms exhibit higher  1-year growth rates, as shown quite dramatically  in
Table 3.  We  find that new firms have over 8%  annual  growth  compared to -12% and -11%  1-year
growth for firms age 3-10 and over 10 years, respectively.
Again,  this suggests the importance of firms that have been established  during the transition
period.
14 The asset value of Romanian firms can certainly be influenced by the Romanian accounting law
that requires all assets to be booked at their historical value  and does not allow revaluations to take
place (see Chaves et al, 2001).
5 See Klapper and Sulla (2002) for a more detailed study of the Ukraine.
15We  also  find  that although  absolute  leverage  ratios  are  low across  the  region,  smaller  and
younger firm are in general more leveraged, which suggests that leverage ratios tend to decrease with
size and age.  As shown in Table 7, we find significantly negative correlations  between firm age and
the  ratio  of total  debt-to-equity  in  all  countries.  Furthermore,  most  debt  in  all  countries  is
concentrated  in the  short-term, which implies  that there  is very little access to (or demand for) long-
term  financing.  This  may  be  as  a result  of weak  property  and  collateral  laws,  as  well  as  the
concetration of firms in the service sector, which generally  implies that firms have less fixed-assets  to
use as collateral.
A  final  interesting  feature  is the  higher  concentration  of smaller  and  younger firms  in the
service  sector,  while the  relatively  larger  and  older  firms  are  more  characteristic  of the  industrial
sector.  One explanation  may be that during the Soviet  era the  service  sector was underemphasized
and almost non-existent; therefore,  this sector may have provided the greatest opportunities  for new
entrepreneurs.  In addition,  this  may reflect  the  low costs  necessary to  enter  many service  sectors
versus  the  difficulties  for  new  firms  to  access  the  long-term  financing  necessary  to  purchase
equipment and machinery needed to enter the manufacturing  sector.
4.2 Summary Statistics by Size
Table  4  shows  summary  statistics  by  firm  size.  We  use  the  European  convention  of
identifying SMEs as firms with less than 250 employees and provide summary statistics that compare
SMEs  and large  firms. - Since the  collapse of communism, the development  of the SME sector has
become one of the principal economic- reform priorities for domestic politicians and outside bilateral
and multilateral  providers of financial  aid.  For example, -the European Bank for Reconstruction  and
Development (EBRD)  was established to support private  sector development  in formerly communist
16countries  and  along  with the  European  Union  and the  World  Bank  has emerged  as  an  important
provider of assistance to SME development within reforming countries.
An  immediate result of the liberalization of the business environment and the assistance  of a
multitude of international programs  is that the SME sector in Eastern  Europe has developed at a very
fast pace and the growth of the SME sector in the post-communist  countries has been heralded  is one
of the  prominent  success  stories of East  European  economies.'6 However,  many new  SMEs have
been created  from  the  break-up  of larger  inefficient  state  enterprises  and  from the privatization  of
smaller units of large  (often formally state-owned)  firms and these "new"  SMEs have relatively small
sizes  and low survival  rates.17 Although  our data does not allow  us to study firm  exits,  our sample
does confirm that the median employment  of individual  SMEs is quite  low.  In half of the countries
that we  study,  which  account  for  more  than  60%  of SMEs  in the  sample,  the  median  number  of
employees is less than 50.
Although  in  Eastern  Europe  the percentage  of the  number of SMEs  compared  to the  total
number of firms may be  high, the percentage  of employment  that is attributable to the  SME  sector
varies  considerably.  For examples,  in Russia the participation  of SMEs  in the total employment  is
only 8%, but in Estonia we find  that SMEs employ  71%  of total  employees  - the  size of the  SME
sector  is  not  homogeneous  even  among  countries  of the  FSU.  Across  countries,  the  average
percentage  of employees  in the  SME  sector is  about  30%.  In comparison,  if we look  at the  SME
sector  in developed  countries,  we  find that the  share  in total  employment  is much higher and goes
16 See Levitsky (1996)  and the OECD (1996).
17 See Pransikar (1998),  Svejnar (2002), and Smith (1998).
17from  approximately  53%  for  the  US  and  Canada  and  57%  for  Germany  to more  than  80%  for
Belgium.'8
A  primary reason  for the underdevelopment  of the  SME  sector  is the legacy  of very large
Soviet  firms  that  employed  very  high numbers  of employees  and  the  virtual  elimination  of small
firms and entrepreneurship.  In addition,  another reason that these countries have small SME  sectors
(as measured  by employment) could be financial  credit constraints - which would imply that SMEs
were unable  to access  outside financing necessary  to grow.  For example, Pissarides (1999)  showed
that credit constraints limited the growth of SMEs in the CEE countries.  We see in our data sample
that firms do not have access to long-term debt (unless we assume that firms voluntarily  decided not
to borrow long-term).  Most financing is concentrated  in the short run and with limited participation
of trade  credit;  consequently,  we  can presume  that  SMEs are  limited  to  high  levels  of contractual
short-term debt.
In addition, leverage ratios - measured as the ratio of liabilities to equity and debt to equity -
vary considerably  among SMEs  in the cross section of Eastern  European countries, going from very
low levels  in the  Ukraine to very  indebted  SMEs  in Croatia (with debt-to-equity  ratios of 0.39 and
1.99, respectively).  Nonetheless,  there  seems to be a clear pattern  in the relation  between  leverage
and size - in examining the comparison between SMEs and large firms, we find that in every country
in our sample, leverage reduces with size.  This evidence is shown quite convincingly in Figure  1.
According to some studies on privatized  firms  in transition economies  (for example, Harper,
1999), relatively  larger firms face more  difficulties  improving performance  after  privatization.  We
would  expect that firms  with lower profits  should  have  less  outside borrowing,  since  they  are  less
able to repay the interest  and principle.  Although we do not have information  on privatized  versus
18 Data on the percentage of employment attributable to the SME sector in developed countries  is
provided by the OECD.
18non-privatized  firms  - but assuming  the likely  inclusion  of privatized  firms  in our  sample  - this
suggests  that  we  should  expect  to  find a  negative  relation  between  size  and  performance.  We
examine  profitability  ratios  within  our  sample  and  find  a  wide  cross-country  variation,  but
consistently  the highest levels  of performance  are  found in relatively small, highly  leveraged  firms.
For example,  ROE  shows  a  very persistent  negative  relation  with size  - ROE is  largest  for  small
firms  in  all  countries  - which  reasonably  relates  to  the  leverage  pattern  described  in  previous
research.
Next, we test some theoretical  predictions on the relationship between  country characteristics
and  the  development  of the  SME  sector.  As  shown  in Table  6  we  calculate  simple  correlations
between the size of the  SME sector (proxied  by the percentage  of total and employment  attributable
to  SMEs) and  indicators  of macroeconomic  growth  (logged  GDP  per capita and  the  1-year  growth
rate of GDP), financial  development  (private  capital  as a percentage  of GDP  and the percentage  of
state-owned  and foreign  banking  assets)  and legal  and judicial  efficiency  (the "rule  of law"  index
from Kaufman  and  Kraay,  2001).  We  find  a positively  significant  relationship  between  a business
environment that promotes access to financing and the size of the SME sector.  For example, we find
that a better legal environment  - that allows banks to write strong contracts and have  such contracts
enforced in a court of law - increases the percentage  of SMEs.
We also find that greater foreign bank assets is related to a higher percentage  of SMEs,  which
may  suggest  that foreign  bank entry  encourages  domestic  banks  to  lend  "downstream"  to  smaller
customers.  This is  consistent  with Clarke  et al.  (2001)  who  found  that  foreign  bank  penetration
improves  financing  conditions  for firms of all sizes.  We also  find a negative  relation  with state-
owned  bank assets,  which suggests that the  SME  sector  is larger in countries with less  state-owned
bank penetration, which implies greater market-based  lending behavior.  Finally, we find that the size
19of the  SME  sector  is  larger  in  countries  with higher real  economic  development  and  greater  GDP
growth.  Although  we  cannot interpret  causality,  this  suggests interdependence  between the  size  of
the SME  sector  and growth - whereas greater growth should  create more opportunities  for SMEs  to
provide goods and services  to larger firms and a more prosperous population, it may also be the case
that the SME sector contributes  substantially to real growth.  We leave a more rigorous study of this
question to future research.
Overall,  we  find that the  SME  sector is associated  with young firms.  We  also  find that  the
SME  sector has relatively  higher leverage  ratios, suggesting that larger firms either have  less access
to outside financing or less investment opportunities.  At the firm level, SMEs exhibit very low levels
of employment;  however,  since  the  number of SMEs in some countries  is so large,  there  are  some
countries  where  the  SME  sector  makes  a  big  contribution  to  the  total  employment  generation.
Finally,  our  results  provide  evidence  of  a  positive  correlation  between  leverage  and  firms'
profitability.  In  other  words,  we  find that  the  SME  sector  in Eastern  Europe  is  relatively  more
profitable  and has greater access to financing, as compared to large firms.  This implies that SMEs
may have  growth  opportunities  that can  be  realized  with access  to borrowing.  This suggests  that
promoting the development  and growth of firms in the SME sector  in Eastern  Europe may be a way
to develop a stronger corporate sector in the future.
To summarize our results:
*  We find,  in4general, a positive relationship .between firm size and age.
*  We-find a positive link between profitability and leverage  (short-term debt), which
suggests a relationship between profitability and-access to working capital financing.
*  We fina-atz younger ilrms have higher leverage and growth.
20*  We find that older and larger firms have smaller cash ratios, which suggest that these
firms are more dependent on internal sources of financing.
*  Finally, we find that smaller and younger firms are likely to be in the services sector.
5.  Tests of Capital Structure Theory
Although a thorough  analysis of the  capital structure of firms in Eastern Europe  exceeds the
scope of this paper, we have used a simple regression analysis in order to further explore the relations
between debt ratios and some firm characteristic.  Our intention is only to provide a first glance at the
behavior of firms in Eastern Europe and leave a more rigorous empirical  study of capital structure to
future  research.  A  distinctive  novelty  of this  study  is our examination  of financial  structure  in  a
sample of private and publicly traded firms, where the vast majority of firms are privately owned.
We  evaluate  the  key  relations  between  short-term  and  long-term  debt  ratios  and  firm
characteristics  as  predicted  by  principal  theories  of  capital  structure.  Table  8  summarizes  the
predicted  results  according  to these  varying  theories.  First,  the Static Trade Off Theory (Myers,
1977), which argues that firms decide between the trade off of the benefits of tax-shields offered by
borrowing new debt  against the  costs of bankruptcy  that highly leveraged  firms  are  more likely to
face.  For example, this theory predicts that leverage  should be higher in larger firms  with stronger
performance  and  higher marginal  taxes.  Second,  the Pecking Order Theory (Myers  and Majluf,
1984),  which  assumes a situation  in which  entrepreneurs  who are  currently  managing  some  assets
need to raise funds to undertake  a new project whose profitability is known only to them.  Under this
scenario  with  asymmetric  information,  raising  external  capital  is costly,  because  the  mangers  are
unable to convince investors of the true expected  value of the project.  This theory  argues that firms
should rely  first on internal,  rather than  external,  sources  of funds and,  when external  financing  is
21necessary,  they should prefer to raise debt before equity;  in other words,  leverage  should be lower in
firms with greater retained earnings.  Eastern European  firms are an ideal sample  to test this theory,
since  many  countries  suffer  from  weak  transparency  and  disclosure  requirements  and  poor
accounting standards, which exacerbate the information asymmetries.
Third,  we  include  the Risk Shifting Hypothesis (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976),  which  argues
that  shareholders  of  highly  leveraged  firms  may  invest  suboptimally  - to  the  detriment  of
bondholders  - in negative  present  value projects  that generate  high benefits  to the stockholders  in
good  states  and  large  loses  to  debtholders  in bad  states.  Closely  related  is the  Underinvestment
Theory  (Myers,  1977),  which  similarly  argues  that  shareholders  of highly  leveraged  firms  have
incentives to pass up some positive net present value investments,  since the return from investment
would  primarily  favor  debtholders,  even  though  the  cost  of  investments  is  assumed  by  the
equityholders.  Both of these theories  predict  that bondholders  will  only invest in firms  with high
collateral values in order to receive some compensation  in the bad states.  This suggests that leverage
ratios should be higher in firms with greater collateral values.
Finally,  the Free Cash Flow Theory (Jensen,  1986) and Agency Cost Hypothesis (Titman and
Wessels,  1988, Stulz,  1990) examine the impact of the manager-shareholder  agency problems  on the
capital  structure  of  firms.  These  theories  argue  that  debt  should  be  used  to  limit  managerial
discretion in firms with greater profitability (discretionary cash) and less growth opportunities.  These
theories  predict  a positive  relation  between  profitability  and  leverage  and  a negative  relationship
between leverage and growth opportunities.  Lastly, we compare our results to previous cross-country
studies  of  firm  behavior  in  emerging  markets  (such  as  Booth,  Aivazian,  Demirguc-Kunt  and
Maksimovic,  2001).
22Table 9 shows our regression results for total debt, short-term debt, and long-term debt ratios.
However, we add the caveat that it may be difficult to interpret our predictions of debt maturity, since
as previously discussed; the firms in our sample are characterized by extremely low levels of long-
term financing.  It may be the case that in some of these countries less-developed banking systems,
weak collateral law, and poor credit information registries reduce the availability of long-term debt
and therefore,  short-term debt may be used as a substitute for long-term financing.  Consequently,  our
results may also be explained by additional  "supply-side" hypotheses.
We use the natural  log of total Sales as a measure of SIZE and the number of years since
incorporation  to measure AGE.  We use return on equity (ROE) to measure profitability (PROFIT) -
this measure  is preferable to ROA because of the high concentration of service firms in our sample -
and use the 1-year growth rate of sales to measure GROWTH.  TANGIBILITY is measured as the
ratio of fixed assets to total assets and NDTS measures non-debt tax shields, estimated as the ratio of
depreciation to total assets.  We also include industry dummies (indicating manufacturing and service
firms) and country  dummies in all regressions.
As predicted by the Static Trade Off theory, we find a positive relation between SIZE and
total, short-, and long-term financing.  This implies that bigger firms have better access to long-term
financing, as measured by the natural log of sales and employment (not shown).  In addition, we find
a negative relationship between AGE  and all measures of debt.  This is consistent with our
summary statistics that suggest that younger (more profitable) firms are more likely to have greater
debt outstanding.
As discussed above,  capital structure theory predicts an inverse relation between growth
opportunities and long-term debt and a positive relation of growth opportunities and short-term
financing.  We find a persistent and significantly positive relation between growth and all types of
23debt.  This result could also be interpreted as a supply side phenomenon,  where firms showing more
promising growth opportunities get better access to external financing.  The relation between
profitability and debt maturity is consistent across theories:  First, we find that firms use internal
funds before using long-term debt (but not before short-term debt), which may be explained by the
relative inaccessibility of long-term debt in the region.  Second, we find that total and short-term  debt
are positively related to profitability, which might be the most important factor in accessing outside
financing in countries with weak collateral laws.
We also find a negative relation between tangibility and total and short-term  debt and a
positive relationship between tangibility and long-term debt.  These results are consistent with most
theories on capital structure that suggest that firms without fixed-assets to use for collateral are
unable to access long-term financing.  For example, theories predict that higher collateral value
reduces bankruptcy costs (Static  Trade Off Theory), allows firms' access to risk free debt (Pecking
Order Theory),  and increases opportunities for perks consumption (Free Cash Flow Theory).  This is
also highly consistent with the evidence  in previous  debt maturity literature that found that firms with
higher compositions of fixed assets might borrow long-term debt in preference  to short-term  debt (see
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic,  1999).  Finally,,we find a significantly negative relation between
the depreciation to total assets ratio and all debt types, which provides support for the Static Trade
Off theory, according to which firms with high levels of non-debt tax shields would be less likely to
look for additional tax benefits.
These results  highlight the  uniqueness of the Eastern  European  region - such as  our finding
that younger firms have greater debt usage - as well as the robustness of capital structure theory as it
applies  even  in  transition  countries.  Our  econometric  tests  support  our  intuition  based  on  the
summary statistics and correlation  tests.  These findings underline the relationship  between access to
24debt  financing  and  a new  wave  of young,  profitable,  and  growing  firms  that are  emerging  in the
region.
6. Conclusion and Remarks
The Amadeus  database provides us for the  first time with the opportunity  to study the  firm-
level behavior of small and private firms across a large sample of Eastern  European countries.  Our
summary  statistics  suggest that the  size of the  SME sector  (as measured  by the percentage  of total
employment)  in Eastern  European  countries  is  smaller  than what  we  observe  in most  developed
economies  (such as the US,  Germany, and Belgium).  Although we find  in almost every country  in
our sample a large number of SMEs as a percentage of total  firms, the SMEs in Eastern  Europe are
generally very small  and  employ very few individuals.  We suggest that this evidence  may support
findings in previous research that SMEs in Eastern Europe suffer from financial constraints - i.e. low
absolute amounts  of outside  financing - that impede their growth.  Furthermore,  neither  SMEs nor
large firms in these countries seem able to attain reasonable  levels of growth.
However,  we also  find evidence  suggesting  that  SMEs seem to constitute the  most dynamic
sector of Eastern European economies,  relative to larger firms.  In general, the SME sector comprises
relatively  younger,  more highly leveraged,  and more profitable  firms.  This suggests that a new type
of firm is emerging  in transition economies that is more market- and profit-oriented.  But at the same
time, these SMEs are only borrowing short-term debt, which appears to be the only type of financing
that these firms can access.
Some policy implications  can be easily derived  from this analysis.  Since  SMEs appear to be
the healthiest  segment  of the  corporate sector,  government policies  should encourage  the  growth of
this sector, which could help jump-start the growth of a more dynamic and profitable private sector.
25Among the policy  objectives  should  be improving  the macroeconomric  environment;  developing  an
efficient legal and judicial system that allows contract enforcement,  M&A, and efficient resolution of
financial  distress;  permitting  foreign  bank  and  corporate  entry;  and  development  of the  financial
sector and debt markets.  For example,  one initiative  should be to improve access  to long-term debt,
which requires overall improvements  in financial  development  and depth.  Our analysis also suggests
that  further  growth  of  the  SME  sector  would  probably  follow  improvements  in  the  legal  and
regulatory environment.
The Amadeus  data will allow us to  study many new and interesting  research  questions.  For
example, this data can be used to study reasons for differences  in firm growth across  firm  sizes and
countries;  capital  structure  and  debt maturity;  the  relationship  between  performance  and  access  to
financing;  and  explanations  for  variations  in  cash  holdings.'9 We  expect  that  this paper  is  only  a
preview of important  and relevant research  to  come.  For example,  by identifying country and  firm
characteristics  that promote  the growth of SMEs,  we  can develop  a roadmap of policies to develop
the  small  business  sector.  This  research  can  provide  powerful  policy  tools  to  operational  staff
working on the growth and development of the private sector in developing countries.
19 For a greater discussion of proposed future work see Demirguc-Kunt,  A. and T. Beck, 2002,
"Research Proposal: Small and Medium Enterprises:  Overcoming Growth Constraints".
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30Table 1: Amadeus Coverage of Eastern EuroDean firms, by Industry and Employment,  1999
Sample  includes  all nonfinancial,  private,  and publicly traded firms  with more  than  10  employees.  SMEs are  defined  as firms with
less than 250 employees.
All Firms  SMEs  SMEs as a Percentage of:
All Firms  Agriculture  Industry  Service  All Firms  Agriculture  Industry  Service  All Firms  Population
All Countries  97,107  10,293  42,933  34,270  79,723  8,027  33,636  30,264  82 10%  0.025%
Bosnia-Herzegovina  935  96  451  355  812  86  367  328  86.84%  0.021%
Bulgaria  15,941  2,261  6,540  6,516  15,123  2,225  5,976  6,310  94.87%  0.184%
Croatia  4,271  165  1,760  2,140  3,838  143  1,498  2,000  89.86%  0.088%
Czech Republic  5,500  322  2,152  2,723  4,301  268  1,422  2,367  78.20%  0.042%
Estonia  5,783  620  1,956  2,459  5,656  613  1,889  2,413  97.80%  0.408%
Hungary  4,260  165  1,863  891  3,614  127  1,448  774  84.84%  0.036%
Latvia  1,864  44  650  1,089  1,634  37  532  999  87.66%  0.068%
Lithuania  774  19  314  425  638  12  209  403  82.43%  0.017%
Poland  9,484  132  4,960  3,835  6,746  108  3,202  3,120  71.13%  0.017%
Romania  27,335  3,158  15,186  8,704  25,535  3,037  13,943  8,305  93.42%  0.114%
Russia  2,889  77  1,476  1,038  1,415  21  568  645  48.98%  0.001%
Slovakia  1,221  80  493  553  831  67  239  448  68.06%  0.015%
Slovenia  297  5  165  113  202  4  93  93  68.01%  0.010%
Ukraine  14,326  2,992  3,822  2,591  7,783  1,170  1,526  1,373  54.33%  0.016%
Yugoslavia (FR)  2,227  157  1,145  838  1,595  109  724  686  71.62%  0.015%Table 2A: Median Summary Statistics. All Firms, 1999
Sample includes all nonfinancial, private, and publicly traded firms with more than 10 employees.  Current  Ratio equals the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals the ratio of  cash to current liabilities.  ROE equals the ratio of net income to
equity.  ROA equals the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
All Firms  Bosnia - Bulgarta  Croatia  Czech  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovalaa  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia
All  Firms  Herzegovuia  Republic
Observations  935  15941  4271  5500  5783  4260  1864  774  9484  27335  2889  1221  297  14326  2227
OberatofnoaOs.
Across Countries  0.01  0.16  0 04  0 06  0 06  0 04  0 02  0 01  0 10  0.28  0 03  0.01  0 00  0 15  0 02
Total No  148116  1341327  587482  1472955  266252  831761  275167  150566  3220987  3020744  2649311  648695  80267  6509729  801772
Employees  104  25  29  100  21  50  55  49  133  24  257  ISO  165  221  128
(median)
Sales (U$S)  498883  206929  1693721  3014240  430033  2573242  1823899  5849727  283355  1898734  37506108  571973  2155926
Assets (U$S)  1248354  148662  1570135  2433507  196529  1309981  861991  1127647  4402955  139144  1839160  3233579  10481985  1568198  4508002
Age  17  8  9  6  6  6  6  5  8  6  6  6  9  5  9
Liabilities/  0.37  0.71  2.21  112  140  1.29  141  1  08  1  08  1 58  067  1.14  0.77  029  051
Equity
Debt /  Equity  0.36  0 63  1.65  1.04  1.37  1 08  1 23  1 04  1 02  1 47  0.66  1 06  0 68  0 27  050
Short-Term  031  0.58  1 65  0 76  III  1 07  098  0  88  0.90  1 39  0 62  0.83  0.68  0 22  0.42
AcctPay  0 04  0 04  0 02  0.22  0 97  0 17  012  0 22  052  0 00  0.04  0.11  0 05
Equity
Short-Term  /  1.00  1 00  0 95  1 00  1 00  1.00  1 00  1 00  1.00  1 00  1 00  1.00  0 94  0 99  1 00
Total  Debt
Current Ratio  1 06  1 14  1.08  1 32  1 06  1.21  1 24  125  1 13  0 95  1.30  1.12  1 24  1.24  1 45
Cash Ratio  0.02  013  0 04  016  Oil  012  0 08  0 07  0.08  0 07  0 05  0.10  0 04  0 01  0 03
Fixed Assets/  0 75  0.45  0 39  0 44  0 44  0 38  041  0.39  0 44  0 39  0 46  0 52  0 53  0.73  054
Total  Assets
ROE  0.01  005  010  005  008  016  014  013  007  019  000  001  004  -001  000
ROA  002  003  005  006  004  008  009  008  008  009  005  005  001  001  002
Growth  -2 50  -6 85  -6 62  -6  03  2 62  -5 86  -16  49  .14 38  -99  15  -0 14
Agriculture %  0.10  0 14  0 04  006  Oil  0 06  0 02  0 02  0 01  012  0 03  0 07  0 02  0 30  0 07
Industry%  048  042  041  039  036  063  035  041  052  056  051  040  056  038  051
Service %  038  0 42  0 50  050  0 46  0 30  0 58  055  0 40  0 32  0 36  0 45  0 38  0 26  038
32Table 3: Median Summary Statistics, All Countries, All Firms, by Size  and Age,  1999
Sample  includes  all nonfinancial,  private,  and publicly traded firms with more  than 10 employees.  Current  Ratio equals the ratio of
current  assets to current  liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals  the ratio of cash  to current  liabilities.  ROE equals  the ratio of net income  to
equity.  ROA equals the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
All Firms  All firms  Employees  <= 250  Employees  > 250  Firm Age  0-3  Firm Age 3-10  Firm Age >10
No. Observations  97,107  79,723  16,917  13,206  47,863  9,367
% of Total Firms  82.10%  17.42%  13.60%  49.29%  9.65%
Total No. Employees  22,005,131  5,277,815  16,610,566  2,869,021  8,850,285  6,028,548
Employees (median)  55  35  478  50  44  260
Sales (U$S)  618,888  457,712  3,492,729  634,865  730,255  2,774,792
Assets (U$S)  591,525  353,173  4,346,968  494,296  505,993  4,080,677
Age  6  6  8  2  7  42
Liabilities / Equity  0.92  1.08  0.51  1.26  1.29  0.49
Debt / Equity  0.84  0.98  0.47  1.17  1.19  0.44
Short-Term Debt/Equity  0.75  0.88  0.41  1.02  1.06  0.39
Acct Pay / Equity  0.16  0.18  0.10  0.20  0.26  0.10
Short-Term/Total  Debt  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Current Ratio  1.09  1.07  1.21  1.00  1.07  1.28
Cash Ratio  0.07  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.08  0.04
Fixed  Assets / Total Assets  0.47  0.43  0.62  0.40  0.42  0.61
ROE  0.06  0.09  0.00  0.10  0.10  0.00
ROA  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.08  0.02
1-Yr Sales Growth  -8.35  -8.14  -9.40  8.73  -11.55  -10.52
Agriculture %  0.11  0.11  0.14  0.11  0.09  0.09
Industry %  0.47  0.45  0.57  0.45  0.50  0.59
Service %  0.38  0.41  0.24  0.40  0.38  0.26
33Table 4a: Median Summary Statistics, by Age. 1999
Sample  includes  all  nonfinancial,  private,  and  publicly  traded  firms  with  more  than  10  employees  and  less  than  3  years  since
incorporation..  Current Ratio equals the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals  the ratio of cash to current
liabilities.  ROE equals the ratio of net income to equity.  ROA equals the ratio of EBIT to total  assets.
F&rm  Age  Bosnma-  Bulgaria  Croatia  Ce  sinia  Hlungary  Lata  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovakia  Slavenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia 0-3  ff~erzegovina  Republic
No  Observations  89  118  216  903  1,306  706  349  194  1,254  4,868  598  284  22  2,146  153
Counry Obs  10%  1%  5%  16%  23%  17%  19%/o  25%  13%  18%  21%  23%  7%  15%  7%
Employees  3,044  13,266  51,625  151,270  47,362  61,552  32,205  17,538  244,774  571,564  272,045  106,175  3,488  1,239,160  53,953
ountry Emp  2%  1%  9°/0  10%  18%  7%  12%  12%  8%  19%  10%  16%  4%  19%  7%
%  SMEs  Oess  1 00  0 90  0 86  0 98  0.87  0.92  0 94  0 92  0.82  0.94  0 63  0 91  0 71  0 41  0 90
Employees  18  32  100  100  19  32  32  25  86  22  186  100  159  285  51
(median)
Sales (USS)  410,144  718,804  3,201,993  2,167,577  331,076  1,710,062  862,048  4,652,760  205,877  1,385,350  904,673  1,267,368
Assets (USS)  362,486  479,747  3,120,587  1,454,154  130,036  774,971  729,064  434,366  3,990,060  106,396  860,603  2,175,891  7,265,912  2,061,571  1,731,838
Age  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2
LEqubilties  1 66  1 98  3 71  1.8  2.25  1.82  2.45  1 19  134  1 68  1 08  1.25  2 65  0 33  1 27
Debt/Equity  1 52  1.36  2.9  1.73  2 2  1.49  2.2  117  1 29  1 55  1.08  1 23  1 32  0.31  1.24
Short-Term Debt  14  1 08  2.9  1 26  1 69  1 47  1 64  1 05  1.16  1.49  0 98  0.91  1.32  0.27  1.23
/ Equity 
AcAt Pay / Equity  0 08  0 05  0.02  0.32  136  0 17  0.15  0 23  0 52  0.00  0 04  0.12  0 12
Short-Term  /  100  100  100  1.00  100  1.00  100  100  100  100  1.00  100  100  0.95  100
Total  Debt
Current Ratio  1 04  1 00  1  01  1.11  0.98  1.11  1 05  1.21  1.07  0 89  1.23  0 99  1.13  1.08  1.16
Cash Ratio  0 03  0 11  0 04  0 14  0.11  0 12  0.07  0 09  0 08  0 07  0 06  0 08  0.03  0 01  0.03
Fixed  Assets  0.31  0.34  0.31  033  0.38  035  039  0 27  0 4  034  0 31  0.56  0.48  0.7  0 27
Total  Assets
ROE  0  1  0.15  0.07  0.06  0.18  0 2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0 4  0.00  0 01  0.07  -0.02  0 01
ROA  0 07  0 07  0 02  0.04  0 03  0 07  0.07  0 07  0.06  0 05  0.05  0 03  0 01  0 01  0 03
Grov th  . 50.27  1 68  2.45  7.71  10.49  . 5.19  9 03  1225  . -7 91  . 45 25
Agriculture %  0 04  0.00  0 08  0 05  0 14  0 03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.14  0 04  0 02  0.00  0 19  0.03
Industry %  0.39  0.46  0 44  0 29  0 33  0.6  035  0.3  0.44  0.52  0 47  0.29  0.64  0 44  0 43
Service %  0.54  0.54  0.46  0 62  0 44  0 35  0.6  0 69  0 46  0.33  0 42  0 6  0 36  032  0 46
34Table 4b: Median Summary Statistics, by Age.  1999
Sample includes all nonfinancial,  private,  and publicly traded firms with more than 10 employees  and between  4 and  10 years since
incorporation.  Current Ratio equals the  ratio of current assets to  current  liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals  the ratio  of cash  to  current
liabilities.  ROE equals the ratio of net income to equity.  ROA equals the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
Firm Age  Bosnia-  Bulgaria  Croatia  Czech  stonia  Hungary  Larvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovakia  Slovenia  Ukratne  Yugoslavia
4-10  Herzegovna  Republhc
No
Observations  255  994  866  4,007  4,165  3,087  1,502  561  4,722  22,324  1,830  843  220  1,387  1,100
Country  Obs.  27%  6%  20%  73%  72%  72%  81%  72%  50%  82%  63%  69%  74%  10%  49%
Employees  27,024  166,183  144,327  1,107,965  176,225  681,996  239,275  125,928  1,165,958  2,248,700  1,247,808  484,720  58,397  761,965  213,814
%ofTotal  18%  12%  25%  75%  66%  82%  87%  84%  36%  74%  47%  75%  73%  12%  27%
Country  Emp
%  SMEs (less  094  0 90  0 79  0 98  0 92  0 84  081  0 87  0 82  0 93  052  0 70  0 69  0 37  0 84
Employees  42  105  53  100  22  60  60  64  102  24  239  150  160  289  107 (median)
Sales  (U$S)  487,020  707,369  3,091,904  3,236,894  439,453  2,844,373  2,247,496  6,084,029  295,806  . 2,266,866  41,710,687  678,172  1,711,733
Assets (USS)  875,347  512,420  2,811,480  2,517,729  206,522  1,475,582  885,494  1,342,542  4,130,465  144,119  1,660,626  3,299,847  10,564,802  2,213,080  3,027,559
Age  7  7  8  7  7  7  6  6  7  7  6  7  9  5  8
Liabilities?  0.6  1 07  3  19  1.14  1.33  121  1.29  1 05  1 44  1 58  063  123  0.82  027  068
Equity
Debt / Equity  058  0 93  2.55  1.06  13  1  1 15  1 03  138  1 46  0 63  117  0 69  0.25  0 66
Short-Teqt  0 47  0 81  2.55  0 77  1 05  0 99  0.91  0 84  1 2  1 37  0 6  09  0 69  0 21  0 58
Acct Pay/  0 06  0 06  0.02  0.21  091  0 17  0  11  0 23  0 52  0 00  0 04  0 1  0 06
Equity
Short -Term  1 00  1.00  1 00  0 94  1 00  100  1 00  1 00  1 00  1 00  1 00  1 00  1 00  0 94  100
Total  Debt
Current Ratio  1 07  1 09  1 02  1 36  l  l  1 24  128  1 27  1.1  0 97  1 31  114  1 22  1 23  1 32
Cash Ratio  0 02  0 09  0.03  0 15  01  012  0 09  0 07  0 08  0 07  0 06  0 1  0 03  0 01  0.03
Fixed  Assets  0 66  0 44  0 36  0 44  0 44  038  0 42  0 41  0 37  04  0 47  0 49  0.53  0 71  0 48 Total  Assets
ROE  002  004  011  006  006  016  013  0.12  0 15  017  000  001  0.04  000  001
ROA  002  004  005  007  004  008  01  009  011  01  006  006  001  001  002
1-YrSales  -1 01  -7 37  -7 37  -7  8  0 54  -3.41  4  46  -18  58  -14 8  . . 3  11
Growth
Agriculture %  0. 1  0 12  0 03  0 05  011  0 06  0 03  0 03  0 02  0 11  0 02  0 05  0 01  0 2  0 06
Industry %  0 37  0 47  0 38  0 42  0 37  0 64  0 35  0.44  0 47  0 56  0 47  0 46  0 51  0 36  0 46
Service%  048  04  057  046  046  028  058  051  048  0.32  039  042  042  038  045
35Table 4c: Median Summary Statistics, by Age,  1999
Sample  includes  all  nonfinancial,  private,  and  publicly  traded  firms  with  more  than  10  employees  and more  than  10  years  since
incorporation..  Current Ratio equals the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals the ratio of cash  to current
liabilities.  ROE equals the ratio of net income to equity.  ROA equals the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
Firm  Age  Bosnia-  Bulgaria  Cratia  Czech  Es onia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuarna  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovakia  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia
>10  Herzegovina  Republhc
Observations  591  678  923  297  311  37  4  3,138  1  400  93  52  1,868  974
Country  Ohs  63%  4%  22%  5%  5%  1%  0%  33%  0%  14%  8%  18%  13%  44%
Employees  118,048  336,653  330,216  98,030  42,646  28,500  208  1,685,807  4,247  1,070,802  57,700  17,575  1,704,111  534,005
%ofuTotal  80%  25%  56%  7%  16%  3%  0%0  52%  0%  40%  9%  22%  26%  67%
Country  Emp
%  5MEs (less  082  0 62  0 64  0 89  0 64  0 65  1 00  052  017  0 56  054  0 07  055
thian 250Emp)
Employees  110  179  180  200  53  113  16  234  4,247  872  200  214  414  212
(median)
Sales (U$S)  510,557  1,045,534  4,097,114  3,129,733  932,040  7,499,414  5,993,283  1,948,804  1,644,810  33,301,528  894,287  3,095,004
Assets  (U$S)  1,733,893  1,198,824  10,008,092  5,624,421  649,971  4,302,191  173,742  4,754,723  3,123,046  7,297,703  6,648,650  13,070,532  2,931,502  7,403,764
Age  25  39  45  22  36  12  99  45  1,999  46  23  24  52  42
Liabilities  0.25  055  0 72  048  0 85  1 07  5 25  0 76  -1.81  0 57  0 47  0 49  025  036
Equity
Debt /  Equity  0.25  04  0 49  0 45  0 84  1 07  5  19  0 72  -0 35  0 57  0 44  04  0 24  0 36
Short-Termt  0 23  0.37  0.49  0 26  0 64  1 07  421  0 65  -0  33  0.54  0 33  04  02  03
AcctPay  0 03  0.04  . 0 01  0.15  0 86  0 44  0 21  -017  0 00  0 02  01  0 05
Equity
Short -Term/  1 00  1 00  1 00  0.69  0 94  1 00  1 00  0 97  1 00  095  1.00  1 00  0 82  0 95
Total Debt
CurrentRatio  106  1 28  1 18  1 54  1 16  1 35  1  21  1.2  136  132  1.51  1 51  132  1 69
Cash Ratio  0 02  0 09  0 03  0 27  013  0 08  0 09  0 08  053  0 02  014  0 04  001  0 03
Fixed Assets  08  0 58  0 61  0 63  059  0 46  031  0 51  045  0 51  0 65  0 54  0 76  0 59
Total  Assets
ROE  0 01  0 01  0 00  0 00  0 03  015  015  0 03  0 04  -0 42  0 00  0 04  -0 02  0 00
ROA  001  001  001  002  005  007  006  005  037  -0  13  002  001  001  001
1-Yr Sales  -15 69  -13  95  -8 77  -7 05  -I 71  -9 89  -39 48  -17  28  -99  15  -3 53
Growth
Agriculture %  Oil  0 03  0 04  017  0 07  0 06  0 00  0 01  0 00  0 02  0 33  0 04  0 26  0 09
Industry %  0 54  0 71  0.58  0 35  038  0.65  0 00  0 64  1 00  0 79  0 28  0 73  0 54  0 59
Service e%  031  0 23  0 35  0 46  0 49  016  05  0 27  0 00  014  0 32  0 21  015  029
36Table 5a: Median Summary Statistics, by Emplovment.  1999
Sample  includes  all  nonfinancial,  private,  and  publicly  traded  firms  with  more  than  10  employees  and  less than  250  employees.
Current Ratio equals  the ratio  of current assets  to current liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals the ratio of cash to current liabilities.  ROE
equals the ratio of net income to equity.  ROA equals the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
Employees  Bosma;  Bulgaria  Croatia  Czech  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovalia  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia
<-- 250  Her-zegovna  Republhc
No
Observations  812  15,123  3,838  4,301  5,656  3,614  1,634  638  6,746  25,535  1,415  831  202  7,783  1,595
Cof Total  87%  95%  900/0  78%  98%  85%  88%  82%  71%  93%  49%  70%  68%  54%  72%
Employees  69,055  672,585  200,833  390,455  189,921  228,882  111,447  39,062  685,245  1,025,099  209,703  73,945  24,757  1,193,852  162,974
%ofTotal  47%  50%  34%  27%  71%  28%  41%  26%  21%  34%  8%  11%  31%  18%  20%
Country  Emp
%  new firms  Oil  007  019  0 23  012  0 20  0.29  0.20  0.16  018  0 27  010  0 24  056  0 09
(age  0-3)
Employees  101  24  25  50  21  40  42  37  92  22  139  100  119  147  103 (median)
Sales  (USS)  419,541  190,592  1,499,063  2,271,282  411,062  2,046,170  1,374,646  4,411,022  252,177  1,098,281  33,301,528  361,559  1,392,421
Assets (U$S)  988,295  136,682  1,276,917  1,746,003  189,497  1,026,537  733,566  801,686  3,129,106  121,310  579,693  1,837,012  8,009,930  929,440  2,632,167
Age  14  8  9  6  6  6  6  5  8  6  6  6  9  3  9
Liabilities  04  0 72  2 57  12  1 42  1  36  16  1 22  13  1 68  0 78  1  23  1 02  03  0 56 Equity
Debt/Equity  0.39  063  1.99  1  11  139  1 13  137  121  123  155  078  117  079  028  054
Short-Teqn  0 23  0 37  0 49  0 26  0 64  1  07  4 21  0 65  -0 33  054  0 33  04  02  03
AEctPay  0 04  0 04  0 02  0.22  1  03  0 17  0 13  0 22  055  0 00  0 04  012  0 05 Equity
Short -Term  1 00  1.00  0 97  1  00  1 00  1  00  1  00  1 00  1 00  1  00  1  00  1  00  0 96  1  00  1  00 Total Debt
Current Ratio  1 04  1 14  1 07  1  33  1 06  1.22  1  23  1 24  1 14  0 94  1  28  1 13  122  125  1  37
Cash Ratio  0 02  013  0 04  0  17  0  11  012  008  0 08  0 08  0 07  0 08  012  0 04  0 01  0 03
Fixed  Assets  0 74  0 45  0 36  04  0 43  0 36  038  0 35  0 38  038  0 39  048  0 5  0 72  051 Total Assets
ROE  0.01  005  012  006  008  018  016  014  011  021  000  001  004  000  001
ROA  0 02  0 03  0 05  0 06  0 04  0 08  0.1  0 08  0 09  0 09  0 07  0 04  0 01  0 02  0 02
-YroSales  -2  01  -6 39  -7  06  -613  336  -0 02  -5  57  -15 83  -15 59  2 8
Growth
Agriculture %  011  015  0 04  0 06  012  0 05  0 02  0 02  0 02  012  0 01  0 08  0 02  0.27  0 07
Industry%  045  04  039  033  036  06  033  033  048  055  04  029  046  035  045
Service%  04  042  052  055  046  032  061  064  046  033  046  054  046  031  043
37Table 5b: Median Summary Statistics, by Employment. 1999
Sample  includes all nonfinancial,  private,  and publicly traded firms with more than 250 employees.  Current  Ratio equals  the ratio of
current assets to current  liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals  the ratio of cash to current liabilities.  ROE equals the ratio of net income to
equity.  ROA  equals the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
> 250  Herzegovina  Bulgaia  Croatia  Czech  Estoma  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovalaa  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia
Observations  123  816  431  945  125  623  230  135  2,710  1,782  1,468  333  94  6,477  625
%ofuTotal  13%  5%  10%  17%  2%  15%  12%  17%  29%/6  7%  51%  27%  32%  45%  28%
Employees  79,061  668,242  386,149  1,019,000  75,831  597,129  163,720  111,254  2,528,742  1,991,145  2,438,108  560,500  55,260  5,299,377  637,048
Country Emp  53%  50%  66%  69%  28%  72%  59%  74%  790/c  66%  92%  86%  69%  81%  79%
%  new firms  000  0 03  012  016  0 07  0 09  0 09  013  0 09  015  016  0.02  021  0 33  0 02
(age  0-3)
Employees  408  415  447  500  398  469  378  550  462  508  623  1,000  435  408  450
(median)
Sales (USS)  2,329,992  3,031,775  11,476,363  14,930,033  2,367,463  15,720,934  7,553,918  13,325,198  2,140,980  . 9,491,686  41,710,687  855,393  7,550,253
Assets  (U$S)  8,978,885  3,492,463  24,314,143  13,658,035  2,286,727  12,221,789  5,757,834  6,435,367  9,159,317  1,850,142  5,243,514  13,549,870  30,096,244  2,856,619  18,695,979
Age  29  33  44  7  7  6  6  6  24  8  6  6  9  6  34
Liabilities /
Equity  0 23  058  0.85  0 92  0 49  0 97  058  04  083  0 79  0.6  11  0.63  028  0 43
Debt / Equity  0 22  0 48  0 56  086  0 46  0.87  053  04  08  0 72  06  1  01  0 55  0 26  0 43
DebtTEqurty  0 21  0.41  0 56  0.62  0 37  0 84  0 42  0 34  0 72  0 66  0 56  0 82  0 55  021  0 34
AcEtPay/  0.03  0 04  0 02  01  0 71  012  0 07  0 22  0 27  0 00  0 04  Oil  0 06
Short-Term/  1 00  1.00  0 87  082  1 00  I 00  0 86  1 00  I 00  I 00  I 00  I 00  0 87  0 94  095
Current Ratio  117  115  117  1 27  1 11  1 15  1 45  1 43  1 11  117  1 31  1 09  1 35  1 23  1 68
Cash Ratio  0 02  0.07  0 03  01  0 11  0 09  0 11  0 05  0 08  0 07  0 03  0 07  0 03  001  0 03
Fixed Assets  0 78  058  0 6  0 55  0 64  0 47  0 58  058  0 52  051  0 49  057  055  075  058
Total  Assets
ROE  000  002  000  003  002  006  004  004  004  003  -002  001  004  -002  000
ROA  001  0.03  001  0.06  013  005  008  01  006  013  003  005  002  001  001
oYrtSales  -9 3  -10 59  -5  64  05  -1  03  0 78  -6  54  -24 55  -12  51  *99  15  4 46
Agriculture %  008  0 04  005  0 03  0 06  0 06  0 03  0 05  0 01  0 07  0 04  0 03  000  032  0 08
Industry %  0 68  0 69  06  0.62  0 54  0 72  051  0 78  0 64  0 69  0 62  0 68  0  77  041  0 67
Service %  0 22  0 25  0 32  03  0 36  02  039  016  0 26  0 22  0 27  025  021  0 22  0 24
38Table 6: Summarv Statistics of ECA Countries, 1999
Private capital flows and 5-year growth rates of GDP are from IFS  Statistics.  The percentage of banking system's assets in banks that
50%  or more govermnent  and foreign bank assets is from the Bank Regulation and  Supervision Database (Barth, Caprio, and Levine,
2001).  Rule  of Law  is an  index  of several  indicators  that measure the  extent  to which  citizens  have  confidence  in  and  abide  by
country  rules.  This includes  the  perception  of the  effectiveness  of the judiciary  and  the enforceability of contracts  (Kaufman  and
Kraay, 2001).
Private  Logged
Country  capital  GDP  GDP 5-Yr  Government  Foreign  Rule of
Name  flows  (% of  Per Capita  growth  Bank Assets  Assets  law
GDP)
Bosnia  1479.49  32.64  30.00  35.00  -1.11
Bulgaria  13.21  1413.71  -1.68  17.60  73.30  -0.15
Croatia  17.23  4968.81  4.34  36.99  6.67  0.15
Czech Rep.  28.93  5156.75  1.58  19.00  26.00  0.54
Estonia  26.33  4110.26  4.48  0.00  85.00  0.51
Hungary  24.67  5135.82  3.29  2.23  62.00  0.71
Latvia  23.28  2398.29  3.22  . . 0.15
Lithuania  18.47  1976.98  3.30  90.00  0.01  0.18
Poland  11.44  4060.57  5.74  43.70  26.40  0.54
Romania  9.29  1434.69  -0.42  70.00  8.00  -0.09
Russia  11.12  2255.07  -1.23  68.00  9.00  -0.72
Slovak Rep.  32.56  4075.41  5.03  25.80  56.70  0.13
Slovenia  10.80  11159.94  4.24  39.60  4.60  0.83
Ukraine  16.00  840.00  -5.47  . . -0.71
Yugoslavia  . 1181.50  1.03  90.00  0.01  -0.81
Correlations:
wISMEs as a
% ofEmp.  0.145***  0.090***  0.06  -0.548***  0.626***  0.258***
39TABLE 7: Correlations Between Total Debt-to-Equity Ratios and Firm Characteristics
Panel  B  reports  correlation  coefficients  that  are  significant  at the  5%  level;  shaded patterns  indicate  that the  sign  agrees  with the
theoretical predictions  in Panel A. FA/TA  is the ratio of fixed to total assets.  SALESUS is total sales in US$.  DEP/TA is the ratio of
depreciation to total assets.  Cash/TA  is the ratio of cash to total assets.  ROA  is return on assets measured as the ratio of EBIT to total
assets.  AGE  is the number of years since incorporation.  AP/TL is the ratio of accounts payable to total liabilities.  **,  * and*
indicate significance  at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Correlation  BosniaDBulgaria  Croata  C  re  tonia  Hungary  Latvia  Litha  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovakia  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavi
Total Debt/Equity  Herzegovina  RepublicII
FA/TA  4  568"**  40.183***  40 316*"  -0.231***  40  13***  4  291***  '  225***  40 243***  4027***  4.133**  4  465**  4  271***  40 437"*  '  .0291***  4..504***
SALESUS  0 136***  0 01  -0  023  0 036  -0  002  -0 004  -0  051  0.00  4  008  -0  025  1 00  -0  002  0 035
DEP/TA  4  068**  -0  126***  -0  106***  -0  137"**  '  0086**"  -0  172***  4  241***  "'  09***  -0 113***  '  0294***  '  4063***  -0.242***
CASH/TA  0 094*  4  12***  -0 009  -04  I*  l  122'*  4  11S**  -0  105***  -0 097'  4  176***  -0.011  0 012  0 008  -0  024  4  052***  -0  016
AGE  -0 125***  -0 163***  4  253***  -0 031*  4  096***  4  034**  -0  029  -0  069"  4  058***  4  014*  4  055***  0 144***  -0  081  4  071***  -0  015
ROA  0 185**  0 035***  0.028  -0 001  -0  121*** -0  196***  -0  l10*i  -0  107***  0 007  0077***  0086***  0  18"'  0  1j5**  0.056**  0 069"**
APTL  0.  118**  0 102"**  4_ 044***  -0  198"'  0.114"*  -0  169"'  -0 156'*  .04261*"*  .4  028"*'  -0  069"**  -0  102*"'  -0 026***  -0 128"'
40Table 8: Theories of Capital Structure: Relations with Debt
This table shows the correlation coefficient sign predicted by various theories.  SIZE  is the natural log of total sales in US$.  AGE  is
the number of years since incorporation.  PROFIT  is measured by ROE, which is return on equity measured as the ratio of net income
less stock dividends to common equity. GROWTH is the I  -year growth rate of sales.  TANG is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
NDTS are non-deb tax s
hields, measured as the ratio of depreciation to total assets.
SIZE  AGE  PROFIT  GROWTH  TANG  NDTS
Static Trade Off  +  +
Collateral value (Bankruptcy  +  +
costs)__  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
Agency problems  +  +/-
Collateral value  _
Growing industries (+STD)  +/-
Reputation  +
Marginal tax rate &  Non-
debt tax shields
Pecking Order (M&M)  _  +
Collateral value (&  Size)  +
Profitability  _
Risk shifting (J&M)  +
Collateral value  . +
Underinvestment  (M)  +
Collateral value  +
Free Cash Flow (J)  +  +
Collateral value  +
Profitability  +
41TABLE 9: OLS Regressions  of the Determinants of Debt
Panel B  reports OLS regression  results.  Dependent variables are listed in the top row:  LIAB/EQ is the ratio of total liabilities to the
book value of equity; DEBT/EQ is the ratio of total debt to equity; STD/EQ is the ratio of short-term debt to equity; LTD/EQ is the
ratio of long-term  debt to equity.  SIZE  is the natural  log of total  sales  in US$.  AGE  is the number of years since incorporation.
GROWTH is the  1-year 'growth rate of sales.  PROFIT  is measured  by ROE, which  is return on equity  measured as the ratio of net
income less  stock dividends to common  equity.  TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. NDTS are non-deb tax shields,
measured  as,the ratio of depreciation  to total  assets.  All  regressions  include  industry  (SIC)  and country  dummies.  T-statistics  are
shown in parentheses.,:  "*,  **"  and * indicate significance at the 1%,  5% and  10% level, respectively.
LIAB/EQ  DEBT/EQ  STD/EQ  LTD/EQ
Constant  1.215**  1.241***  1.510***  -0.269***
(2.38)  (2.55)  (3.23)  (-2.76)
SIZE  0.084***  0.080***  0.059***  0.021***
(3.52)  (3.51)  (2.70)  (4.63)
AGE  -0.002**  -0.017**  -0.001  -0.001**
(-1.95)  (-1.99)  (-1.57)  (-2.43)
GROWTH  0.014***  0.013***  0.012***  0.001***
(16.12)  (15.83)  (15.46)  5.01)
PROFIT  0.636***  0.678***  0.696***  -0.018*
(11.26)  (12.60)  (13.49)  (-1.68)
TANGIBILITY  -2.420***  -2.391***  -2.555***  0.164***
(-22.71)  (-23.57)  (-26.25)  8.06)
NDTS  -8.973***  -8.694***  -8.091***  -0.603***
(-9.05)  (-9.21)  (-8.94)  (-3.19)
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Dummies
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Dummies
Observations  28,673  28,673  28,673  28,673
Adj. R-sq  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.03
42Figure 1: A Comparison of Leverage of SMEs versus Large Firms
This figure  shows a scatterplot of the leverage of SMEs and large firms against a slope line equal to one.
2.5  -
CL2
E  1  5  -
|  ~~~~<=  250  Emp.  (SMEs)
43Appendix 1: Median Summary Statistics, Employment < 10, 1999
Sample  includes all  nonfinancial, private,  and publicly traded firms with  less than  10 employees.  Current  Ratio equals  the ratio of
current  assets to current liabilities.  Cash Ratio equals the ratio of cash to current liabilities.  ROE equals the ratio of net income to
equity.  ROA  equals the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
<10  E  y  Heregovsna  Bulgaria  Croatia  Cecpbhc  Estonia  Hungary  Laatvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Slovalia  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia
Observabons  86  21,539  13,769  698  16,157  1,292  562  182  525  173,787  6  204  6  3  392
Employees  558  108,106  48,253  3.490  57,644  6,815  3,119  1,075  2,529  475,085  20  605  26  13  1,970
Employees  8  5  3  5  3  5  6  6  5  2  3  2  5  5  S (median)
Sales (USS)  163,652  56,633  180,529  410,235  35,313  692,045  562,675  1,101,558  10,023  120,446  . 2,219,266  185,238
Assets (U$S)  102,406  27,772  95,466  780,144  15,291  286,933  135,416  303,323  8,199,802  2,590  5,712,463  938,040  64,367  5,106,366  158,346
Age  6  4  6  4  3  6  4  4  4  5  2  3  7  5  7
Liabilities  19  0.45  3  78  0 32  0 73  1 53  1.87  126  0 65  0 67  3 75  0.49  086  1 69  3 02 Equity
Debt /  Equity  1 77  0 37  3 4  0.3  07  1 27  1 75  1 24  0 64  0 47  3 75  0 47  0 69  1 69  2 97
AcctPay/  01  0 00  000  0 09  12  015  0 15  0 16  0 23  0 00  0 00  1 63  013
Equity
CurrentRatio  1 12  133  109  126  117  1 19  1 19  127  103  097  1 08  102  1 17  0.86  1 13
Cash Ratio  0 05  0.33  0 08  02  0 23  019  012  0 08  0 27  0 1  0 02  012  0 09  0 00  0 05
Fixed Assets  0 22  022  0.14  0 32  024  0 24  018  025  048  016  0 06  0 51  031  0 44  013 Total Assets
ROE  0 05  013  0 26  0 01  0 04  0 26  0.3  0 16  0 09  0 17  0 06  0 00  0 04  0 00  01
ROA  0 04  0 06  0 08  0 03  000  0 09  01  0 08  0 05  0.00  0 08  0 02  0 00  0 03  0 03
-Yr Sales  1.23  4  96  -7.34  -11 41  7 08  -4 24  1 33  -24 33  -16 99  25 46 Growthh
Agnculture %  0 09  0 06  0 02  0 02  014  0 04  0 02  0 02  0 01  0 1  0 01  0 02  0 01  017  0 02
Industry%  017  0 25  019  01  019  0 41  016  0 26  0 22  04  0 33  01  0 23  0.17  0 21
Service%  067  064  07  083  054  052  081  069  057  049  057  081  057  05  074
44Appendix 2:  Firm-Level Variables Available in Amadeus
1  Added Value
2  Capital
3  Cash Flow
4  Cash and Cash Equivalents
5  Costs of Employees
6  Cost of  Good Sold
7  Current Assets
8  Current Liabilities
9  Depreciation
10  Extraordinary  Expenses
11  Extraordinary  Revenue
12  Extraordinary  P/L
13  Fixed Assets
14  Financial Expenses
15  Financial P/L
16  Financial Revenue
17  Gross Profit
18  Intangible Fixed Assets
19  Interest Paid
20  Loans
21  Long Term Debt
22  Material  Costs
23  Non Current Liabilities
24  Number of Employees
25  Other Current Assets
26  Other Fixed Assets
27  Other Non-Current Liabilities
28  Other Operating Expenses
29  Operating P/L
30  Operating Revenue/Turnover
31  Other Shareholders  Funds
32  P/L for Period
33  P/L After Tax




38  Tangible Fixed Assets
39  Total Assets
40  Total Shareholder Funds and Liabilities
41  Working  Capital
45Annex: Table 2: Mean Summary Statistics, All Countries 1999
All firms  Employees  <= 250  Employees  > 250  Firm Age  1-3  Firm Age 3-10  Firm Age 10+
# Observations  97,107  79,723  16,917  13,206  47,863  9,367
Total # Employees  22,005,131  5,277,815  16,610,566  2,869,021  8,850,285  6,028,548
Change in Employment  -1,026,083  -266,977  -759,643  -17,855  -399,427  -514,452
Employees (Average)  227  66  982  217  184 91  644
Sales (U$S)  688,536,923  169,374,972  3,397,952,178  4,179,660  15543485  13,524,111
Assets (USS)  599,680,792  83,985,525  2,994,675,796  6,515,640  27570693  22,841,165
Age  11  38  8 27  24 46  1.77  6.59  49 40
Liabilities / Equity  2.53  2.84  1.15  3.35  3.06  1.09
Debt / Equity  2 35  2 63  1.07  3  11  2.88  0 99
Acct Pay / Equity  0 72  0.81  0.30  0.95  0.96  0.23
Current Ratio  1 40  1.37  1.53  1 21  1 28  1 59
Cash Ratio  0  18  019  0.12  0.15  0.17  0.14
Fixed Assets / Total Assets  0.50  0.45  0 70  0.45  0 47  0 63
ROE  0.19  0.23  -0.01  0 29  0.25  -0.03
ROA  0.07  0.08  0 05  0 07  0.1  0.03
1-Yr Sales Growth  -1.18  -0 54  -6.21  12.27  -5.28  -6 99
Agriculture%  0.11  0 11  0.14  0.11  0.09  009
Industry %  0 47  0.45  0 57  0 45  0.5  0.59
Service %  0.38  041  0.24  0 40  0.38  0 26
46Annex: Table  3: Mean Summary Statistics, 1999
All  FirmsBosnia  Bugrizroea  lch  &oi  Russian  Saai  lvna  Urie  Ygsai
Herzegovinas  a  Bulgaria  CrOatNa  RuCz  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Federation  Slovakia  Slovema  Ufrane  Yugoslavia
#  Observations  935  15941  4271  5500  5783  4260  1864  774  9484  27335  2889  1221  297  14326  2227
Total #  148116  1341327  587482  1472955  266252  831761  275167  150566  3220987  3020744  2649311  648695  80267  6509729  801772
Employees
Change in  . -65607  -12958  0 00  -3262  3163  -35  -18517  -213784  -98732  -54195  000  0.00  -564158  2002
Employment
Employees
(Average)  158  84  138  268  46  195  148  195  340  III  917  531  270  454  360
Sales (USS)  1271720  991788  5268729  12309426  1011904  9620355  . 4461688  19832401  1096082  . 11789240  37506108  6030246577  8307842
Assets (USS)  3502710  965097  12113719  13028027  942547  6756339  3323274  4431541  20842058  1196670  47463272  18540688  24135819  3926479101  27780825
Age  20.74  20 64  25.38  9 23  716  617  5.65  4.91  20 98  5.69  12 66  6 43  12 31  2138  26.2
Liabilities /
Equity  9 36  2 06  -1251  57  413  412  4 93  3.67  14 43  631  22 89  2417  10 29  168  5 37  1135
Debt / Equity  1.04  15  4 57  2  54  2 55  1 84  2  18  1.63  2 02  3 73  1 82  2 69  1 25  0 52  1.29
Acct Pay / Equity  2 55  0.74  -0 05  2 24  2 93  0 73  6 22  0 68  12 27  0.43  035  1 00  1 08
Current Ratio  1.61  3.48  1.68  3.89  3 95  1  99  3.31  2 09  151  7 01  2 03  1.93  1 76  2 42  2 37
Cash Ratio  0.13  0.8  018  0 96  192  0 64  0 43  041  0 29  046  0.21  0 46  0 09  0.18  012
Fixed Assets /
Total  Assets  0 65  0 46  0 41  0 43  0 47  0.39  0.42  0 51  0.5  0 45  0.45  0 49  05  0 72  0 51
ROE  0.05  0 09  0 17  0 11  0 08  021  019  016  012  0.45  -0 28  0 03  0 05  -0 02  0 00
ROA  0 04  0 03  0  06  0 08  0 04  01  0.12  0.1  0 09  012  0 00  0 05  0 01  0 04  0 03
I-Yr Sales
Growth  . 7 67  -3  36  -2 72  -2 91  9 02  11 38  -3 08  -5 26  -7.71  . -99  15  2 67
Agriculture %  0 1  0 14  0 04  0 06  0 11  0 06  0 02  0 02  0 01  012  0 03  0 07  0 02  03  0 07
Industry %  0 48  0 42  0 41  0 39  0 36  0 63  0 35  041  0 52  0 56  0 51  04  056  0 38  0 51
Service%  038  042  05  05  046  03  058  055  04  032  036  045  038  026  038
47Annex:  Table  4a: Mean  Summary Statistics, by number employment,  1999
Panel  A  Bosnia  Blg  Croatia  Czech  Russian
Employees < 250  Her  regovrna,  ulai  Craa  Estonia  Hungwy  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Federation  Slovakia  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia
#Observations  .'812.  1!513i  3838  4301  5656  3614  1634  638  6746  25535  1415  831  202  7783  1595
Firms %  87  95  ,90  .,,  78.  98  85  88  82  71  93  49  68  68  54  72
Employees  69055"41  672585  200833  390455  189921  228882  111447  39062  685245  1025099  209703  73945  24757  1193852  162974
EmployeesI 
Employees %  47,  50  34  27  71  28  41  26  21  34  8  1  1  31  18  20
Change in  Total404
Employment  40114  -3478  -5138  3474  2194  -12429  -38491  -51977  -19400  . -102255  637
Employees  85  44  52  91  34  63  68  61  102  40  148  89  123  153  102
(Average)  I
Sales (USS)  0958  560738  3068600  5819178  879615  4682422  3445600  9266058  599386  2530583  33301528  2884418841  3431848
Assets (USS)  2200415  453463  3973781  54828,18  751284  2883350  1826334  3609046  9123688  425333  13046905  4875179  11718026  821773435  6718309
%  Age 0-3  11  - 7'  12  19  23  20  20  29  16  18  27  24  10  56  9
Age  19.15  1684  ,  196  679  695  607  561  481  1515  555  665  62  1121  673  1988
Liabilities  113  1 68  5  91  2 83  2 68  2 23  2 66  1 82  2 4  4 13  2 43  3 09  1 75  0 58  1 52
Equity
Debt/Equity  1.09  152  4 9  2 69  258  191  2.34  177  2 28  3 9  241  294  142  055  1.47
Acct Pay / Equity  0 14  0.3  . 0 07  0 43  1 79  0 37  021  04  1 62  0 03  0.11  0 22  013
Current Ratio  1 26  1  71  1 25  1 74  1.26  1 42  1 58  1 45  1  31  1 03  1  57  1 42  1  41  1 64  18
Cash Ratio  0 06  0 33  0.09  0 33  0 24  0 21  0  18  013  0  17  014  015  02  0 06  0 06  0 06
Fixed  Assets  0 64  0 46  04  041  0 4:6  0 37  04  0 38  05  0 41  041  0 46  0 48  0 65  0 49
Total Assets
ROE  005  009  019  012  009  022  02  018  015  047  -011  006  006  001  001
ROA  0 04  0 03  0 06  0 08  0 04  0 1  0  12  0 1  0 1  012  0 06  0 05  0 01  0 04  0 03
I-Yr Sales  819  -3 00  -2 76  -3 02  9 83  12 65  -2 65  -4 97  -7 99  . 4 77
Growth
Agriculture %  0  11  0  15  0.04  0 06  012  0 05  0 02  0 02  0 02  012  0 01  008  0 02  0 27  0 07
Industry%  045  04  039  033  036  06  033  033  048  055  04  029  046  035  045
Service%  04  042  052  055  046  032  061  064  046  033  046  054  046  031  043
48Annex: Table  4b: Mean Summary Statistics, by number employment,  1999
mployees > 20  Herzegovmia  Bulgaria  Croatia  Cech  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Federaion  Slovakia  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavi
Observations  123  816  431  945  125  623  230  135  2710  1782  1468  333  94  6477  625
rms %  13  5  10  17  2  15  12  17  29  7  51  27  32  45  28
loyees  79061  668242  386149  1019000  75831  597129  163720  111254  2528742  1991145  2438108  560500  55260  5299377  637048
mployces %  53  50  66  69  28  72  59  74  79  66  92  86  69  81  79
hangemint  -25508  -9492  1851  -549  -2229  6037  175485  47821  -35064  . 460674  1365
mploymnent  258  94215  59229  607  1745  481  3564674  35
mployees  642 77  818 92  895 94  1078 31  606 65  958 47  711  83  824  10  933.12  1117.37  1660 84  1683  18  587 87  81818  1019 28 Wverage)
ales (U$S)  4323328  8727831  30114560  41216403  6920816  40956545  9592277 69  45660032  8148126  . 32505364  41710686  8453088590  2071864.
ssets (U$S)  12099972  10198138  84630621  46916688  9589680  31967863  13958058  8328681 46  41193743  12246768  80825473  53969141  50708157  7646922441  8164411!
kge  0-3  0  3  7  12  16  9  13  9  9  15  16  21  2  33  2
ge  31 26  35 03  46 69  21 02  16 88  6 72  59  5 41  35 57  7 7  18 52  6 95  14 55  27.39  42 39
quilty  067  1  25  207  21  131  1  73  127  0.86  1 67  146  1  32  2.24  114  051  088
ebt  /  Equity  0 67  1.07  1  63  2 03  1 04  1  44  1  05  0 86  1 59  1 37  1  31  2 22  0 94  0 48  0 85
cot  Pay /  Equity  0 11  0.22  0 07  0.3  1  24  0 27  0 17  0 39  0.72  0 03  011  0  22  012
urrentRatio  145  1  67  1.39  1.6  1 33  1  34  191  1 71  1 26  1 25  156  133  1.54  1  65  205
ashRatio  0 04  0 25  0 08  0 26  0 23  017  0 27  012  018  014  01  013  0 05  0 04  0 07
ixed Assets/  0.78  0 62  0 58  0 53  1.1  0 52  058  1 09  051  0 99  0.48  0 56  0 56  081  057
otal Assets
OE  0 02  0 05  0 00  0 06  0 03  Oil  01  0 05  0 06  0 17  -0.44  -0 01  0 04  -0  03  -0.01
OA  0 03  0 03  0 02  0 08  0.07  0 07  01  0 09  0 07  0 14  -0 06  0.06  0 01  0 03  003
-Yr Sales  -1 88  -8.28  412  068  3 86  5  68  4  03  -15.02  -13.78  -99.15  -2 86 rowth
griculture %  0 08  0 04  0 05  0 03  0 06  0 06  0 03  0 05  0 01  0 07  0.04  0 03  0 00  0 32  008
idustry %  0 68  0 69  0 6  0 62  054  0 72  051  0 78  0 64  0 69  0 62  0 68  0 77  041  0 67
ervice %  0 22  0 25  0 32  03  0 36  02  0 39  0  16  0 26  0 22  0 27  0 25  0.21  0 22  0 24
49Annex: Table  5a: Mean Summary Statistics. by number age. 1999
Panel  C  Bosnia  Czech  Hn~iRussian
Firm Age 0-3  Herzegovna  Bulgaria  Croatia  Repubhc  Fstonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuanma  Poland  Romamna  Federation  Slovakia  Slovenia  Ukraine  Yugoslavia
#  Observations  89  118  216  903  1306  706  349  194  1254  4868  598  284  22  2146  153
Frmns %  10  l  5  16  23  17  19  25  13  18  21  23  7  15  7
Employees  3044  13266  51625  151270  47362  61552  32205  17538  244774  571564  272045  106175  3488  1239160  53953
Employees %  2  1  9  10  18  7  12  12  8  19  10  16  4  19  7
ChangeinTotal  3171  1460  583  2483  1269  676  11976  47246  8111  -94783  47 Employment
Employees  34  112  239  168  36  87  92  90  195  117  455  374  159  577  353 (Average)
Sales (U$S)  884071  2297780  7777367  8499026  763882  4905152  1869925  12266975  1124870  5465811  6407192  9375622
Assets (USS)  895527  1987798  17022904  7543118  703578  3202051  2498549  1649281  14655804  1378096  26441823  13102159  10685623  11108367  37607856
Age  239  1 88  199  1 91  1 73  2.22  2 08  1 88  1 88  1 57  193  199  2 05  178  208
Liabilities/  231  2 51  778  3 95  3 69  2 76  3 83  1 93  2 59  4 57  2 67  3 43  2.34  0 66  238 Equity
Debt / Equity  214  2  11  6 03  3 8  3 49  2 34  3 26  1 87  2 47  4 26  2 66  3 43  1 84  061  231
Acct Pay / Equity  019  05  . 0 08  0 55  2 17  0 43  0 24  0 44  1 76  0 03  012  0 25  019
CuffentRatio  1.25  1 37  121  1 5  III  132  1.33  143  1 19  097  1 56  1 27  1 24  151  1  55
Cash Ratio  0 07  028  0 07  0 28  0 23  0.2  015  014  018  0.14  0.14  014  0 07  0 06  0.06
Total Assets  0.41  0 43  0 35  037  041  0.37  0.42  0 39  0 42  0.39  035  0 49  0 39  07  0 34
ROE  015  0 23  0.18  0 14  0.2  0 25  0 24  0.2  0  15  0 57  -0.22  0 03  0 02  -0 02  001
ROA  006  007  004  0.07  004  009  01  01  008  0.09  003  004  001  004  004
1-YrSales  39 05  3  76  2  17  5 99  17  79  24 13  625  15 63  . -4  16  14 99 Growth
Agriculture %  0 04  0 00  0 08  0 05  014  0 03  0 01  001  001  0 14  0 04  0 02  0 00  019  0 03
Industry %  0 39  0 46  0 44  0 29  033  06  0 35  0.3  0 44  0 52  0 47  0 29  0 64  0 44  0 43
Service %  0 54  0.54  0 46  0 62  0 44  0 35  06  0 69  0 46  0 33  0 42  06  0 36  0 32  0 46
50Annex: Table  5b: Mean Summary Statistics, by number age. 1999
Panel  D  Bosnia  Czech  IRussian
Firm Age 3-10  Herzegovma  BuIgarta  Croatia  Ruch  Estonia  Hungay  Latvua  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Federation  Slovakia  Slovenia  Ukrame  Yugoslavia
#  Observations  255  994  866  4,007  4,165  3,087  1,502  561  4,722  22,324  1,830  843  220  1,387  1,100
Firms %  27  6  20  73  72  72  81  72  50  82  63  69  74  10  49
Employees  27,024  166,1X3  144,327  1,107,965  176,225  681,996  239,275  125,928  1,165,958  2,248,700  1,247,808  484,720  58,397  761,965  213,814
Employees %  18  12  25  75  66  82  87  84  36  74  47  75  73  12  27
Change in Total  -15,367  666  -430  -2,411  1  -17,864  -30,702  -127,419  -37,468  -169,155  712
Employment
Employees  106  167  167  277  42  221  159  224  247  101  682  575  265  549  194
(Average)54  19
Sales (U$S)  1354188  2017574  7567120  12854576  1001288  11045167  5231696  19036285  910315  11427585  41710687  330684802  6640705
Assets (U$S)  2462164  1561267  19462587  13252967  842567  7840641  3505550  5366607  19140611  854556  47821230  15771075  25814362  689800979  21364865
Age  6 7  7 01  7 27  6 53  6 56  6 88  6 23  5 96  7 08  6 5  6.22  6.29  816  5 42  7.72
Liabilities/  131  2.03  6.5  2 59  2 45  2 01  221  158  2 53  3 84  1 79  2.85  154  051  1.7
Equity  517
Debt / Equity  1.29  1 83  5 48  2 46  2 38  1.71  1 97  1 55  2.42  3 64  1 77  2 69  1 24  0 49  1 64
Acct Pay/ Equity  017  0 33  . 0 07  04  1.58  0.34  02  04  152  0 03  0.11  0.21  013
Current Ratio  1.31  157  I.19  173  1.3  144  168  151  126  106  1.57  1.4  1.45  159  173
Cash Ratio  0.06  0.26  0.07  0 32  0.24  0.21  02  012  0 17  014  013  0  19  0 05  0.05  0 06
FixedAssetsa  0.59  045  04  0.43  048  04  043  053  052  046  046  047  051  071  047
Total Assets
ROE  005  007  017  011  005  02  018  015  018  043  -023  004  006  -401  001
ROA  0 04  0 03  0.06  0 09  0 04  0 1  012  0 1  0 11  0 13  0 02  0.06  0 01  0  04  0 03
I-Yr Sales  8 35  -3 26  -3 58  -4 25  6 4  752  -1  71  -8 45  . -10 29  4 45
Growth
Agriculture %  0.11  012  0.03  0 05  0 11  0 06  0.03  0 03  0 02  0.11  0 02  0 05  0 01  0.2  0 06
Industry %  0 37  0 47  038  0 42  0 37  0 64  0.35  0 44  0 47  0 56  0 47  0 46  051  0 36  0 46
Service %  0 48  04  0 57  0.46  0 46  0 28  0 58  051  048  0 32  0 39  0.42  0 42  038  0.45
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Panel  E  Hosnia  Bulgari  Croatia  Czch  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Slovalka  Slovenia  Ukiraue  Yugoslavia
Firm_Age___  Herzegoveibi  Federation
#Observations  591  678  923  297  311  37  4  3,138  l  400  93  52  1,868  974
Fnns %  63  4  22  5  5  1  0  33  0  14  8  18  13  44
Total  N  3,0
Employees  118,048  336,653  330,216  98,030  42,646  28,500  208  1,685,807  4,247  1,070,802  57,700  17,575  1,704,111  534,005
Employees %  80  25  56  7  16  3  0  52  0  40  9  22  26  67
Change in Total  -30,565  -18,090  -3,407  3,550  -64  -183,627  -1,586  -26,707  -255,296  1,340 Employment
Employees  200  497  358  330  137  770  52  537  4,247  2,677  620  338  912  548
(Avorage)
Sales (USS)  1294912  6473943  12994407  10868302  2181715  23493844  . . 23472019  1948804  . 34710203  33301528  7758487  10020989
Assets (USS)  4344298  8390845  30334009  18914219  3287843  17476916  700829  . 24258164  3123046  81768715  60426349  22665884  12361472  33476516
Age  29.56  43.89  47 84  67.9  37.95  21.7  99  49.53  1999  58 2  21.23  34  17  55 75  50 87
Equity  0.79  1.1  1.62  0.91  1.59  1.99  4 84  . 1.51  -1  81  101  0.78  1.25  0 43  08
Debt / Equity  0.77  0 93  118  0.88  153  186  4.81  1.42  -0 35  1.01  0.75  1.05  0.42  0 78
Acct Pay/  Equity  011  0 17  . 0 02  0.34  1.75  031  037  -0 17  0 03  0.05  . 0.21  0.11
Current Ratio  1.28  1.82  1.41  2 05  1.37  1.43  1.07  135  1 36  1.55  1.65  1 55  1.75  2 09
Cash Ratio  0.06  0.28  0 08  0.41  0.25  0 18  0.07  . 0.18  0.53  008  0.24  0.06  0.05  0.07
Fixed Assets /  0.72  0 6  0.6  0.62  0 63  0 58  033  . 0.5  0 45  0.52  0.63  0.56  0.85  0.58
Total Assets
ROE  0 03  0 00  -0 01  0 00  0.02  0 16  0.24  . 0 04  0 04  -0 65  -0.02  0.03  -0.05  0
ROA  0 04  0 01  0 02  0.03  0 03  0 08  0 06  006  0 37  -0.17  0 03  0 01  0.03  0 03
-Yr Sales  . -5  52  -1023  -7.42  -6.25  -6.23  -6.68  -39 48  . -17 68  . -99  15  -1.34
Agriculture %  0.11  0 03  0 04  0.17  0.07  006  0  0.01  0  0.02  033  0.04  0.26  0 09
Industry %  0.54  0 71  0.58  0.35  0.38  0 65  0  . 0 64  1  0 79  0.28  0.73  0.54  0.59
Service %  0.31  0.23  0.35  0.46  0 49  0 16  0.5  0.27  0  0.14  0.32  0.21  0.15  0.29Policy Research  Working  Paper  Series
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